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OFFERING BALANCE IN TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
INVOLVING THE REJECTION OF SEXUAL ADVANCES
Benjamin I. Han
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains an antiretaliation provision that protects employees when they oppose activity
unlawful under the statute. To be protected from retaliation, however,
the employee’s opposition must be performed in a manner that Title
VII protects. The requirements for protected activity are that the
employee must: 1) speak out or protest against an act, 2) that s/he has
a reasonable, good-faith belief violates Title VII, 3) in a reasonable
manner.
A split of authority has emerged as a result of the courts
addressing facts involving an employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s
sexual advances. The Fifth Circuit and a minority of district courts
hold that the employee’s rejection, without more, is not enough to be
protected from retaliation. The Eighth Circuit and a majority of
district courts, however, hold that rejection of sexual advances is by
definition “opposition,” and should be a protected activity.
This comment will argue that an employee who rejects a
supervisor’s sexual advances should be granted the presumption that
s/he has spoken out against the act and will offer a framework for
courts to apply when confronted with the factual scenario at bar. The
framework involves granting the employee the presumption that s/he
has properly protested, but having her/him show that s/he had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that her supervisor’s advances violated
Title VII. If diligently applied, this approach will allow the courts to
reasonably balance the interests and vulnerabilities of the employee
and employer, while staying true to the purposes of Title VII.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a female employee working at your everyday
company. Like any employee with ambition, her goal is to do her job,
and do it well. She has worked hard through college to get to her
current position, and she can visualize that with the right amount of
determination, her future with the company is bright. Months into her
tenure, however, she begins to notice that her supervisor has been
giving her attention that many would deem inappropriate. It begins
with comments that demonstrate an appreciation of her presence, such
as statements involving her physical appearance and attire. Then the
comments escalate into sexual advances when the supervisor asks the
employee to join him for dinner or to take their lunch break to a local
motel room. Inexperienced, third-person observation would provide
that the employee has clear and simple options to remedy her situation.
It is a valuable exercise, however, to consider what goes through the
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female employee’s mind as her supervisor is waiting for a response to
his sexual propositions.
It is no secret that women have historically struggled to reach
equality in the workplace, and, given this knowledge, women likely
perceive that they face an uphill battle in terms of promotion and
recognition. It has been observed that women face “pervasive
occupational segregation, underrepresentation in leadership positions,
and inequities in compensation.”1 In 2008, it was measured that
women earn approximately 75% of what men earn and that wage gap
has “closed very little in three decades.”2 One year after their college
graduation, full-time female workers earn only 80% of their male
counterparts, and the gap widens to females earning only 69% of male
earnings ten years after graduation, “even when occupation, hours,
parent-hood, and other factors typically associated with earnings over
time are statistically controlled.”3 Another study also revealed that
when women are acknowledged to have been successful in a male
gender-typed job, they are “less liked and more personally derogated
than equivalently successful men” and that being disliked can have
career-affecting outcomes in terms of evaluations and
recommendations.4
Given the issues above, and others like “fear of job loss,
especially if insecurely employed, fear of retribution or retaliation,
reluctance to be viewed as a victim, self-doubt or the fear of being
seen as ‘too sensitive’, the belief that the harasser will not receive any
penalty, lack of knowledge of rights, and lack of accessibility of
external supports . . . ,”5 it is easy to believe the estimation that only
5-30% of sexual harassment victims file any complaints, with fewer
than 1% subsequently participating in legal proceedings.6 Considering
these factors, it may be easier said than done to take action through
traditional means, such as filing a formal complaint with human
resources or complaining to another supervisor.
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer
cannot discriminate against employees who have opposed any

1

Ruth E. Fassinger, Workplace Diversity and Public Policy: Challenges and
Opportunities for Psychology, 63 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 252, 253 (2008).
2
Id. at 253-54.
3
Id. at 254.
4
Madeline E. Heilman et al., Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who
Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks, 89 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 416
(2004).
5
Paula McDonald, Workplace Sexual Harassment 30 Years on: A Review of the
Literature, 14 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS 1, 9 (2011).
6
Id.
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unlawful employment practice under the statute.7 This assertion under
the opposition clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects
employees from adverse employment actions when they oppose an
unlawful act that violates the statute. To prove retaliation on the basis
of opposition activity, the employee has the burden of establishing a
prima facie case by showing that the employee: (1) “engaged in
protected activity that Title VII protects;” (2) was subjected to “an
adverse employment action;” and (3) the protected activity is causally
connected to the adverse employment action.8 The source of much
litigation in Title VII retaliation cases arises from the issue of whether
the employee engaged in a statutorily protected activity. The courts
have generally required that for an opposition act to be protected, the
employee must: 1) speak out or protest against activity9 2) have a
reasonable, good-faith belief that the activity is unlawful under Title
VII,10 3) protest in a reasonable manner.11 A particular scenario that
has caused confusion among the lower courts is whether an
employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances is a protected
activity under the opposition clause. The disagreement arises from the
issue of what an employee is required to do when s/he engages in an
act of opposition.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and a minority of district
courts subscribe to the belief that an employee’s rejection of sexual
advances, without more, is not enough to be statutorily protected
activity under Title VII.12 The Eighth Circuit and a majority of district
courts, however, subscribe to the belief that an employee’s rejection of
sexual advances is by definition, “opposing” unlawful activity, and is
therefore, protected activity under Title VII.13
This comment will provide a layered argument in proposing a
reasonable approach to retaliation claims involving an employee’s
rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances. Part I of the comment will
provide an overview of the Title VII retaliation landscape,
summarizing the relevant statutory language, the employee’s burden in
retaliation cases, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on retaliation
claims grounded in the opposition clause, and the split of authority

7

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006); Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 269
(2001).
8
Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2005).
9
See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 278
(2009).
10
See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.
11
Rollins v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1989).
12
See LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp., 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007).
13
See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000).
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among the lower courts in terms of the rejection of sexual advances.
Part II of the comment, the argument section, will proceed in layers.
The first subsection will argue that the current federal case law on
opposition activity reveals that the rejection of sexual advances should
be considered protected activity under the opposition clause. The
second subsection will argue that, even if a court does not agree with
the contention that the current federal case law protects the rejection of
sexual advances, such a unique circumstance demands different
treatment from the more traditional forms of opposition activity. The
third subsection will propose a reasonable framework for the courts to
apply when addressing a retaliation claim involving the rejection of
sexual advances. This framework includes granting the employee the
presumption that she has spoken out against discrimination if she
rejected a sexual advance, which is harnessed by the inquiry of
whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the
supervisor violated Title VII by creating a hostile work environment.
The fourth subsection will raise various policy considerations
involving the protection of the rejection of sexual advances and the
application of the suggested framework.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Anti-Retaliation Provision under Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.14 Within the overarching prohibition against discrimination,
Section 704(a) of Title VII also protects employees from retaliation
should they oppose discrimination or participate in Title VII processes,
the relevant language stating: “It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment, for an employment agency . . . to
discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because he has opposed any practice, made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.”15 This retaliation provision of Title
VII is separated into the opposition clause and the participation clause,
with the former protecting a wider range of employee conduct than the

14
15

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006).
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latter.16 The participation clause protects employees from retaliation
only when s/he has participated in the Title VII machinery, meaning
that the employee participated in an investigation, proceeding, hearing,
or litigation under Title VII.17 The opposition clause, however, serves
as a catchall for many activities that are not covered under the
participation clause, in that the employee will be protected from
retaliation if s/he opposes unlawful conduct in a proper manner, even
though the Title VII machinery has not been initiated.18 An example
of opposition activity that is generally accepted by the courts is when
an employee complains to her human resources department about a
supervisor who is sexually harassing her. The rejection of sexual
advances, which is the subject of this comment, does not fall under the
participation clause. So accordingly, we will proceed solely within the
bounds of the opposition clause.
In a retaliation case where the employee is invoking protection
under the opposition clause, the court will apply the traditional threestep McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.19 First, the
employee must establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the
opposition clause, where s/he must show that s/he engaged in an
activity that Title VII protects, s/he was subjected to an adverse
employment action, and the adverse employment action is causally
connected with the employee’s protected activity.20 If the employee is
able to establish a prima facie case, the employer will then have the
burden to produce evidence showing a legitimate non-retaliatory
reason for the adverse employment action.21 If the employer is able to
produce evidence showing such a reason, the employee will have the
opportunity to prove that that the employer’s stated reason was
pretextual.22
This comment focuses on the first element of the employee’s
prima facie case in an opposition clause retaliation claim, the
requirement being that the employee must show that s/he engaged in
an opposition act that Title VII protects. Courts have established
guidelines to determine whether an employee’s opposition should be

16

See Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 94 (1st Cir.
2006) (stating that “[p]rotected conduct . . . also [includes] complaining to one’s
supervisors”).
17
See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Total Sys. Serv., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171,
1174 (11th Cir. 2000).
18
BARBARA T. LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 15-12
(Barbara T. Lindemann et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012).
19
Lemaire, 480 F.3d at 388-89.
20
Id. at 388.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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“protected activity” under Title VII. The guidelines are that the
employee must 1) speak out or protest against activity that, 2) s/he has
a reasonable, good-faith belief is unlawful under Title VII, 3) in a
reasonable manner.23 Although on the surface, the framework for
seeking protection from retaliation seems relatively clear, many issues
persist as to what should be considered “protected activity” when
confronted with the complexities of the modern-day workplace. The
Supreme Court of the United States has only addressed the contours of
“protected activity” against retaliation on a few occasions, and has not
directly addressed whether certain forms of opposition, like the
rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances, should be considered
protected under the opposition clause.24
B.

The Supreme Court and Protected Activity under the
Opposition Clause

In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed the reasonable, goodfaith belief requirement for protected activity in Clark County School
District v. Breeden.25 There, a supervisor made a single sexually
explicit remark in the presence of the plaintiff-employee, saying “I
hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.”26
The employee later complained about the comment to several people,
including the offending employee’s supervisor and the Assistant
Superintendent, and alleged that she was later punished for her
complaints.27 Since sexual harassment was what the employee was
opposing, the Supreme Court stated the relevant legal standard that
establishes a hostile work environment and concluded “no reasonable
person could have believed that the single incident recounted above
violated Title VII’s standard [for sexual harassment].”28
In 2009, the Supreme Court addressed the opposition clause in
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville.29 There, the
employer’s human resources department began looking into rumors of
sexual harassment by the employee relations director, Gene Hughes.30
As part of the investigation, the human resources director called in the

23

See LINDEMANN, supra note 18, at 15-13 to 15-24.
Diana M. Watral, Note, When “No” is Not Enough: The Express Rejection of
Sexual Advances Under Title VII, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 527 (2010).
25
Breeden, 532 U.S. at 268.
26
Id. at 269.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 271.
29
See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 271.
30
Id. at 274.
24

44

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 2:2

plaintiff-employee to ask if she had witnessed any inappropriate
behavior on the part of Hughes, to which she provided several
instances of sexual harassment committed by Hughes.31 After the
investigation, Crawford and the two other employees who accused
Hughes of sexual harassment were terminated, the official reason
being for embezzlement.32 The issue before the Court was whether the
plaintiff-employee engaged in protected activity even though her
opposition was not on her own initiative.33 The Court held even
though she gave her account of Hughes’s sexually harassing behavior
after she had been summoned by the human resources director, the
plaintiff-employee still engaged in protected activity under the
opposition clause.34 The Court elaborated, “nothing in [Title VII]
requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”35
Ultimately, Breeden and Crawford provide two narrow
clarifications of protected activity covered under the opposition clause.
According to Breeden, the courts should inquire as to whether the
employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the act s/he opposed
is unlawful under Title VII.36 To determine if such a reasonable,
good-faith belief existed, a court should, like the Supreme Court in
Breeden, refer to the standard of the discriminatory act that the
employee opposed, and decide whether the offending supervisor’s act
created a reasonable, good-faith belief that the standard was violated.37
According to Crawford, the courts should not limit protected activity
under the opposition clause to protests that are initiated by the
complaining employee. The Court made clear that protection under
the opposition clause may cover untraditional situations where the
employee is not the party that instigates or initiates a complaint.38
Given the limited nature of these rulings, however, the lower courts
have struggled when addressing such untraditional forms of
opposition. An employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances
is no exception, with the situation being illustrated by an employee
simply replying with a “No.” to a supervisor’s sexual advance. The
lower federal courts have understandably split over the issue as to

31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 276-77.
34
Id. at 277.
35
Id. at 277-78.
36
See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.
37
Id. at 270-71.
38
See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277-78.
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whether the employee’s rejection is enough to be protected activity
under the opposition clause. The subsection that follows illustrates the
split of authority.
C.

Circuit Split over the Rejection of Sexual Advances

The circuit split regarding the protected status of rejections of
sexual advances is illustrated through decisions of the Fifth and Eighth
Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Fifth Circuit subscribes to the belief
that such rejections are not protected activity while the Eighth Circuit
believes that the rejections should be protected under the opposition
clause.
In LeMaire v. Louisiana Department of Transportation, the
Fifth Circuit held that an employee’s rejection of his supervisor’s
sexual advances was not protected activity under the opposition
clause.39 There, the employee claimed that on two separate occasions
his supervisor subjected him to sexually explicit stories that included
past acts of molestation, his sex life with his wife, and his homosexual
inclinations.40 The employee asked his supervisor to stop talking
about such topics, but the supervisor refused and continued the
conversation.41 The supervisor later ordered the employee to spray
herbicide on a large area of a lawn, which the employee believed was
outside of his job description, and, therefore, believed was retaliation
for asking the supervisor to stop telling the sexually explicit stories.42
The employee later left the job site and reported the incident to the
Bridge Operator Foreman.43 The employee was then suspended
without pay by the District Maintenance Engineer for refusing to spray
the herbicide as ordered by the supervisor and for leaving the work site
without authorization.44
In holding that the rejection of the
supervisor’s sexual advances was not protected activity, the Fifth
Circuit simply asserted that the employee “provide[d] no authority for
the proposition that rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected
activity for purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII.”45
In Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that the
employee’s rejection of sexual advances was protected activity under

39

Lemaire, 480 F.3d at 389.
Id. at 385.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 386.
45
Id. at 389.
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the opposition clause.46 There, the employee, Kerry Ogden, was
subjected to multiple sexual advances by her supervisor, including
numerous physical advances and sexual propositions.47 As a result of
her rebuffs, the supervisor berated Ogden over work matters and also
refused to complete her evaluation, thereby preventing the effectuation
of her annual raise.48 The Eighth Circuit agreed with Ogden, holding
that she engaged in “the most basic form of protected activity” when
she rebuffed her supervisor’s sexual advances, and further asserted in a
general manner that “[e]mployers may not retaliate against employees
who ‘oppose discriminatory conduct . . . .”49
D.

Federal District Court Treatment of Rejection of Sexual
Advances

Currently, the vast majority of district courts align with the
Eighth Circuit in holding that the rejection of sexual advances is
protected activity under the opposition clause. An example of the
lower courts’ treatment of the issue is illustrated in Burrell v. City
University of New York, a 1995 decision from the Southern District of
New York.50 The employee, Cherie Burrell, was employed as an
assistant to the Dean of CUNY Medical School/Sophie Davis School
of Biomedical Education (the “Dean”).51 The Dean served as Burrell’s
supervisor, and throughout Burrell’s employment, he made numerous
sexual advances towards her, all of which were rebuffed.52 The
advances began as comments and actions that revealed a sexual
interest in Burrell, but later turned into advances that included
invitations to dinner and even propositions to engage in sex over the
telephone.53
Burrell later complained to the school system’s
Affirmative Action Office, and she was subsequently transferred to
another department and ultimately terminated for her immigration
status.54 The Southern District of New York held that “Burrell has
presented evidence which would support an inference that she was
terminated in retaliation either for making her initial complaint to

46

See Ogden, 214 F.3d at 999.
Id. at 1003-04.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1007.
50
Burrell v. City Univ. of N.Y., 894 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
51
Id. at 753.
52
Id. at 754-55.
53
Id. at 755.
54
Id. at 756.
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CUNY’s Affirmative Action Office or for refusing to accede to the
Dean’s sexual advances.”55
A minority of district courts, however, does agree with the
Fifth Circuit and holds that the rejection of sexual advances is not
protected activity under the opposition clause. An example of such
alignment is Bowers v. Radiological Society of North American, Inc., a
1999 case from the Northern District of Illinois.56 There, the
employee, Beverly Bowers, was subjected to sexual advances by her
supervisor, with whom she lived in the same townhouse.57 After
rejecting the advances, she moved out of the townhouse and a month
later, the supervisor gave what Bowers believed to be an unfair
negative performance review.58 Bowers was later replaced by another
employee and ultimately discharged on the ground that her position
was being eliminated.59 The court asserted that “[o]pposition clearly
includes filing a charge with the EEOC, bringing a lawsuit in court, or
submitting a complaint to management . . . [and that] [i]nformal
methods can also constitute protected activity.”60 The court held,
however, that Bowers “has not alleged that she engaged in any form of
opposition . . . [, but,] [i]nstead, she [only] alleges that she refused Ms.
Davis’ advances and that she did not participate in the conduct.”61
In assessing the split of authority, it becomes clear that the
disagreement arises from what the courts require of employees during
the act of opposition. The courts aligning with the Fifth Circuit
subscribe to a strict approach where the employees may be required to
do more than merely reject a supervisor’s sexual advances. Compared
to the traditional methods of opposition such as complaining to the
human resources department, this side of the split believes that a mere
rejection, without more, seems too ambiguous of a protest to invoke
protection under Title VII, likely because the employee has not spoken
out against the discriminatory act. The courts aligning with the Eighth
Circuit, however, subscribe to a more relaxed approach, in that a
rejection of sexual advances is by definition “opposition” of unlawful
activity. Regardless of the side of the split, however, many of the
courts have not engaged in thorough analyses as to why they do or do
not find the rejection of sexual advances protected under Title VII.
The present issue requires a more involved and detailed discussion

55

Id. at 761.
Bowers v. Radiological Soc’y of N. Am., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 594 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
57
Id. at 597.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 599.
61
Id.

56
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compared to what the courts have engaged in past opinions, especially
in light of the ambiguous nature of the rejection of sexual advances
and the complicated nature of the workplace.
II. ARGUMENT: REJECTING A SUPERVISOR’S SEXUAL ADVANCES IS
“SPEAKING OUT” AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, BUT COURTS MUST
ASSESS THE EMPLOYEE’S REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH BELIEF TO
DETERMINE PROTECTED ACTIVITY
This comment will argue that when an employee responds,
“No.” to a supervisor’s sexual advances, the rejection is sufficient to
satisfy the “speaking out” requirement for protected activity under the
opposition clause. This comment will make this argument by first
establishing similarities and then by establishing differences. The first
subsection will maintain that finding rejection of sexual advances to be
protected activity is consistent with federal case law. The second
subsection will argue that if one finds the first subsection
unconvincing, then realizing what makes the rejection of sexual
advances unique should persuade courts to distinguish this scenario
from other, more traditional forms of opposition activity. The third
subsection will argue that if a court should agree with the arguments of
either the first or the second subsection, that court should assess
whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the
supervisor violated Title VII. Finally, the fourth subsection will
consider the policy implications surrounding the issue at bar.
A.
Drawing Comparisons: Current Federal Case Law on
Protected Activity Under the Opposition Clause of Title VII.
Although there is a split of authority on the precise issue of
whether the rejection of sexual advances constitutes “speaking out”
against discrimination, the federal courts have established a landscape
that indicates that such activity is indeed “speaking out.” As addressed
in the introduction section above, the Supreme Court addressed the
scope of the opposition clause for the first time in Crawford.62 In the
opinion, Justice Souter revealed insight as to how the Court would
likely rule on facts involving the rejection of sexual advances. In
ruling that the plaintiff engaged in opposition activity, Justice Souter
maintained that the Court adopted a broad interpretation of opposition,
and the term could be used “to speak of someone who has taken no
action at all to advance a position beyond disclosing it.”63 He went

62
63

See Crawford, 555 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 277.
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further and asserted that it would be opposition activity “if an
employee took a stand against an employer’s discriminatory practices
not by ‘instigating’ action, but by standing pat, say, by refusing to
follow a supervisor’s order to fire a junior worker for discriminatory
reasons.”64 Although this statement was made in dictum, it is arguable
that the rejection of sexual advances is less ambiguous of an
opposition than Justice Souter’s opposition hypothetical in Crawford.
Justice Souter’s employee, who defies his supervisor’s discriminatory
intent by refusing to fire a subordinate, could be defying the
supervisor for one of many reasons.65 The subordinate may be a close
friend of the employee, the employee may think that the subordinate is
too valuable to terminate, or any other reason that does not serve as
opposing a violation of Title VII. Ultimately, Justice Souter gives the
employee the benefit of the doubt and would assume that the employee
is opposing the Title VII violation, even though it is ambiguous as to
what the employee is actually opposing. In terms of an employee who
rejects a sexual advance, among the variety of reasons s/he could be
doing so is that s/he opposes behavior that violates Title VII. So why
should s/he not receive the similar benefit of the doubt received by the
hypothetical employee in Crawford?
It is also helpful to refer to the Supreme Court’s labor law
jurisprudence, as the Court has previously looked to its labor law
decisions for guidance in determining a Title VII issue.66 In the 1984
case National Labor Relations Board v. City Disposal Systems, Inc.,
the employer had a collective bargaining agreement with Local 247 of
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen, and Helpers of America where the provision read:
[t]he Employer shall not require employees to take out
on the streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe
operating condition or equipped with safety appliances
prescribed by law. It shall not be a violation of the
Agreement where employees refuse to operate such
equipment unless such refusal is unjustified.67

64

Id.
Id.
66
See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 142 (2004) (stating that
constructive discharge has been recognized in the labor law context).
67
National Labor Relations Board v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 824-25
(1984).
65
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The employer asked the plaintiff-employee to drive a truck that needed
to have repairs performed on the brakes.68 The employee refused, but
he refused in a general manner without referring to his rights pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement or the National Labor Relations
Act (the “NLRA”).69 The employee was subsequently discharged, and
he later filed an unfair labor practice charge.70 The Supreme Court
held that the employee had engaged in protected, concerted activity,
which prevents the employer from discharging him on the grounds of
his protected behavior under the NLRA.71 The Court maintained that
even though the employee did not mention he was asserting his rights
under the collective bargaining agreement or the NLRA,
[a]s long as the employee’s statement or action is based
on a reasonable and honest belief that he is being, or
has been, asked to perform a task that he is not required
to perform under his collective-bargaining agreement,
and the statement or action is reasonably directed
toward the enforcement of a collectively bargained
right . . .
the employee has engaged in protected, concerted activity.72
The factual scenario in the City Disposal decision is analogous
to an employee’s rejection of sexual advances in the Title VII context.
The employer in City Disposal ordered the employee to drive a
defective truck, which was a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, and the employee simply refused without asserting any
rights other than his own safety.73 The employee who rejects a sexual
advance performs an analogous act by giving a general, negative
response to a request by her supervisor that we assume violated Title
VII by creating a hostile work environment. If the refusal in City
Disposal sufficed to be protected and concerted in the labor law
context, the analogous refusal of a sexual advance should be enough to
be considered “speaking out” in the Title VII context.
The lower federal courts have also deemed scenarios similar to
the rejection of sexual advances protected under the opposition clause.
The scenario most comparable to sexual advance rejections would be
an employee’s refusal to participate in a supervisor’s discriminatory
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practice, which generally occurs not by the employee orally objecting
to a discriminatory practice, but by the employee merely failing to
engage in the discriminatory activity. An example of such a scenario
is illustrated in EEOC v. St. Anne’s Hospital of Chicago, where the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee’s refusal to
participate in the employer’s discriminatory activity was a protected
activity.74 There, the employee was in charge of the security
department of the hospital, and in 1978, she hired a black man to fill a
vacant position in her department.75 The hiring was met with violent
public opposition, as the hospital began receiving bomb threats from
one or more persons claiming membership in the American Nazi
Party, with several fires also starting unexpectedly.76 The employee
was subsequently discharged because she “was an irritant to the person
or persons making the calls and/or setting the fires.”77 Like an
employee who rejects a sexual advance, the employee in St. Anne’s
Hospital did not make it clear that she was opposing an unlawful
activity under Title VII when she made the hire.78 Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit interpreted the facts to show that the employee hired the black
applicant without any contrary directions from the employer.79 With
no discriminatory act from the employer prior to the employee’s hiring
of the black applicant, the employee had nothing to oppose when she
hired him, and yet, the Seventh Circuit still deemed the employee’s
action as protected opposition.
Similarly, in Taylor v. Scottpolar Corp., the Federal District
Court of Arizona held that an employee’s refusal to participate in
discriminating against a pregnant subordinate constituted protected
activity.80 There, the plaintiff was a district manager of Scottpolar,
and he alleged that his supervisor sought to terminate a foreman
because of her pregnancy by “fish[ing] for damning information
against her.”81 Although the plaintiff “did not openly disagree with
[his supervisor] . . . he refused to participate.”82 Drawing a
comparison to rejection of sexual advances, it was not clear whether
the plaintiff in Taylor refused to participate because he opposed
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discrimination that violated Title VII, or for some other reason not
related to the discriminatory act. In the face of this ambiguity, the
court still asserted that if the plaintiff could prove he refused to
participate, his actions would be protected under the opposition
clause.83
By assessing the current landscape of opposition activity under
Title VII, it becomes clear that the rejection of sexual advances should
constitute “speaking out” against discrimination. When courts decide
cases involving Title VII retaliation, the opinions have had a tendency
to neglect addressing why a certain act is protected opposition activity.
What is clear is that in cases of an ambiguous protest, such as a refusal
to participate in discriminatory activities, there is a judicial inclination
to give the employee the benefit of the doubt when determining if the
employee’s opposition should be protected. It only seems natural that
this inclination should exist in a rejection of sexual advances scenario
as well, and there are many reasons why this should be the case. It
may be as simple as the desire to stay true to Title VII’s main purpose
of protecting employees from discrimination in the workplace, or it
may be that the rejection of sexual advances seems no different than
other forms of protected opposition activity, in that the employee’s
goal is to put a stop to the discriminatory conduct. Additionally,
judges may find it burdensome to require employees to reject the
sexual advance and then later oppose the discriminatory act in a more
traditional way, considering that s/he may receive an adverse
employment action before s/he has the chance to protest in that
traditional manner (i.e., complaining to another supervisor, human
resources, or an equal employment opportunity officer). Lastly, judges
may continue to sympathize with employees regarding the complicated
dynamics of the workplace, in that employees must maintain a difficult
balance, weighing the need to keep a job with the need to maintain
personal sanctity.
Judges may also remember that in sexual
harassment cases, the courts do not allow an employee’s consent to
sexual advances to eliminate an otherwise meritorious claim,
considering that the advances may still have been “unwelcome.”84 In
light of that sympathetic and realistic approach to sexual harassment
claims, allowing a retaliation claim to fail when an employee actually
rejected the advance would seem contradictory.
B.
Drawing Distinctions: Rejecting Sexual Advances is a Unique
Situation That Calls for Flexibility in Assessing Protected Activity.
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The previous section argued that the federal courts have created a body
of case law that indicates that the rejection of sexual advances should
constitute “speaking out” against discrimination. If a court remains
unconvinced by drawing comparisons to current case law, then
perhaps distinguishing rejection of sexual advances from other, more
traditional forms of opposition activity will be more persuasive. This
subsection will first argue that the courts have long understood that the
facts underlying a retaliation claim under the opposition clause come
in a wide variety, and that the weights applied to the different
requirements of protected activity depends on the details of the
retaliation scenario. The second part of this section will address the
unique nature of the rejection of sexual advances, which will
ultimately set up the argument that such scenarios call for a particular
legal analysis.
1.
The Courts Have Recognized That Flexibility is Required to
Properly Analyze Opposition Activity Regarding Title VII Retaliation
Claims.
The facts arising out of a retaliation claim under the opposition
clause can take a wide variety of forms. In deciding opposition clause
cases, the lower courts have made it clear that the language of the
opposition clause protects a wider range of activities than does Title
VII’s participation clause.85 Protests, demonstrations, confrontation,
refusal to participate in discriminatory practices, and self-help
activities may, in appropriate instances, constitute “opposition” under
the statute.86 So in a sense, the opposition clause is meant to serve as a
limited catchall provision for protected activity that is not covered
under the participation clause. As discussed in the Background
Section of this comment, the courts have determined that for
opposition to be protected, the employee must “speak out” against the
employer’s discriminatory act and the opposition must be
accompanied by a reasonable, good-faith belief that the discriminatory
act was unlawful under Title VII.87 These two requirements can be
applied to virtually any retaliation fact pattern imaginable, with some
scenarios being easier to assess than others. The easiest fact pattern
for a court to assess is when an employee witnesses a discriminatory
act that is clearly in violation of Title VII and s/he goes forward to
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report the act to an upper-level supervisor. The employee here fulfills
the requirements of the opposition clause by speaking out against the
discriminatory act in a reasonable way to a superior, which is among
the most traditional ways to handle such situations. And since the act
was clearly in violation of Title VII, the employee possessed a
reasonable, good-faith belief that the discriminatory act violated the
statute.
The courts, however, are not always presented with facts where
it is clear that the employee should receive protection under the
opposition clause. And not surprisingly, “in cases where it is not clear
whether an employee’s words or conduct constitute ‘opposition,’ the
decisions are not easily reconciled.”88 Ambiguous protests, like our
own rejection of sexual advances, have forced courts to engage in an
exercise of flexibility to ensure that an employee’s meritorious claim
proceeds while still staying faithful to the statutory language of Title
VII. So given the countervailing interests involved in determining
whether an employee’s opposition activity should be protected, courts
often choose to balance the requirements of protected activity
depending on the facts with which they are presented.
An example of such flexibility in the face of an ambiguous
protest is illustrated in Casna v. City of Loves Park.89 There, the
employee had a hearing impairment, and upon apologizing to her
supervisor for failing to file a report in a timely manner, the supervisor
responded, “How can you work if you cannot hear?”90 The employee
responded, “Aren’t you being discriminatory?”91 Although the
supervisor knew that the employee had a hearing impairment, she also
had seen the employee listening to music at her desk.92 In ruling that
the employee’s response was protected activity under the opposition
clause, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not even consider
whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that the
supervisor’s question amounted to a statutory violation.93 Therefore, it
is evident that the “speaking out” component outweighed the
reasonable, good-faith belief requirement, considering the employee
used the word “discriminatory” in her opposition act.94 Additionally,
in Green v. Franklin National Bank of Minneapolis, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the employee engaged in a protected
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activity because she complained to higher-level supervisors of alleged
racial discrimination.95 Like the Seventh Circuit in Casna, the Eighth
Circuit failed to consider whether the employee had a reasonable,
good-faith belief that a discriminatory act was conducted in violation
of Title VII.
There is value to the proposition that courts should exercise
flexibility when assessing retaliation claims. The workplace is a
highly political and complicated environment, and opposition activity
and the corresponding retaliation come in an infinite amount of shapes
and sizes. Just like with any issue before the court, however, giving a
judge too much discretion in determining which opposition activity
should be protected under Title VII can be dangerous. To balance this
judicial flexibility, the court should consider the facts of each case.
Where the facts demonstrate a clear and egregious act of
discrimination by the employer, the court should focus on analyzing
the “speaking out” component of protected activity, as it is obvious
that the employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that Title VII
was violated. Regarding the rejection of sexual advances, however,
elements of flexibility and strict diligence are required in the protected
activity analysis to arrive at a fair determination. The following
subsection will provide the context for what makes the rejection of
sexual advances fundamentally different from other traditional forms
of opposition, thereby setting up the proposed framework that
incorporates flexibility and diligence in one analysis.
2.

Articulating the Judicial Inclination: What Makes the Rejection
of Sexual Advances Unique?

The rejection of sexual advances presents a unique dynamic
that deserves flexible treatment when determining whether such
activity is protected. Title VII, however, does not permit judges to
protect conduct from retaliation because certain conduct just feels like
it should be protected. As addressed previously, opposition clause
doctrine demands that employees engage in opposition in a particular
manner to be deemed protected activity. We have seen, however, that
federal courts have neglected to engage in a rigorous analysis when
determining whether the employee’s opposition is a protected activity.
The courts instead act on an inclination to find such opposition
protected. The rejection of sexual advances is a scenario where such a
judicial inclination would arise, and although never articulated, the
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inclination is justified by the fact that the scenario is distinguishable
from any other discriminatory act covered under Title VII.
Consider the different situations in which life places us. We
are often thrown into scenarios where we must interact with superiors,
interact with children, study in a library, play a round of golf, and so
on. If you are a reasonable and rational person, you realize that each
of these different situations has its own particular rules, and as a
reasonable and rational person, you would abide by them. When
interacting with a superior, you know to speak in a manner that
conveys respect, whereas when you speak to a child, you know to
speak using simple words so that the child understands what you are
saying. Just like when studying in a library, you know to speak
quietly, so you do not disturb others in their studies and on a golf
course, you know not to speak during someone’s backswing so you do
not disturb their concentration.
With these concepts in mind, the unique nature of the rejection
of sexual advances can be illustrated by using the following analogy.
First, imagine two people playing a game of hot potato, which is the
game where participants toss each other a ball to the sound of music
and the player holding the ball when the music stops is eliminated
from the game. As the game begins, the first player tosses the ball to
the second player, and the second player, of course, tosses the ball
back. The first player fully expects to receive the ball back and the
second player naturally, and quickly, tosses the ball back, as she
knows the rules of the game. Stepping away from hot potato, now
imagine a baseball game, with a pitcher throwing a pitch to a batter,
and assume that the pitch is one that the batter is able to hit. The rules
of baseball instill much different expectations on the pitcher, as the
batter has many choices on how to approach the pitch. He may take a
swing at the ball, go for a bunt, or let the ball pass. These
hypotheticals demonstrate that the rules of the game dictate the
players’ expectations and choices.
The typical discriminatory act that would violate Title VII
resembles the baseball hypothetical: an act is done or a comment is
made at, or in the presence of, an employee, and the employee is left
with a choice on how to respond. The game here could be titled “SelfPreservation,” where the rules dictate that one considers all
consequences before responding to a situation. Applying these rules,
the supervisor, like the pitcher, acts in a unilateral manner and does not
expect a particular reaction from the employee. But the employee, like
the batter, is left with a choice on how to address what s/he has
witnessed or experienced. There is not a single natural or normal way
for a person to oppose the discriminatory act, meaning that observing
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the act and making the conscious decision to protest is only one of the
many options available to her.
An employee’s rejection of sexual advances resembles the
game of hot potato, in that the situation exists in the form of a “back
and forth” initiated by the supervisor. The game here could be titled
“Human Interaction,” and the rules dictate that if you are asked a
question, you should respond. Applying the rules, the supervisor
makes advances, typically in the form of a question or invitation, and
the employee responds. The employee here is provided with a natural
and sole mechanism to respond to an employer’s discriminatory act,
and more importantly, the mechanism exists because of the format
constructed by the supervisor in making the advance. Although the
substance of the employee’s response may vary, the rules of “Human
Interaction” dictate that s/he must respond, as opposed to the rules of
“Self-Preservation.” Simply not responding to a sexual advance, or
any question for that matter, would be a violation of human interaction
rules, and is not something that a reasonable and rational person would
do.
The courts have always been open to considering the
importance of context, or the rules of the situation, in deciding cases
under Title VII. Considering these analogies, it is clear that the
rejection of sexual advances presents a situation that is unique from
any other opposition activity scenario. The supervisor provides a
framework where the employee must respond to the advances, and
upon rejecting the advance, the courts should give the employee the
presumption that s/he has “spoken out.” The rules dictating more
traditional opposition scenarios do not require the employee to respond
at all, as the employee must make an active choice to protest.
So accordingly, it is fair to expect employees in more traditional
scenarios to speak out against discriminatory acts in a more concrete
manner.
C.

A Reasonable Solution: When to Exercise Flexibility and When
to Exercise Diligence

When confronting a rejection of sexual advances scenario in a
Title VII retaliation case, the courts should prevent an employee’s
claim to live or die based on whether that employee has properly
“spoken out” against the discriminatory act. This comment has
presented several arguments that assert that the rejection of sexual
advances is a unique situation where the courts should presume that
the employee has indeed “spoken out” against discrimination, even
though the employee did not do so in a traditional manner to which
courts are accustomed to protecting. First, the Supreme Court has
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maintained in Crawford that activity similar to rejection of sexual
advances should be considered protected activity. Second, many
federal appellate courts have held that opposition activity
fundamentally similar to rejection of sexual advances is protected
activity. Third, even if one were to disregard the current case law that
is applicable to the issue at bar, the rejection of sexual advances is a
unique scenario because it occurs in a “question and answer”
framework that is initiated by the supervisor. There is no other
opposition scenario that occurs in such a manner, meaning that the
rejection of sexual advances demands a flexible approach in terms of
the “speaking out” requirement of protected activity. Thus, although
the employee does not exercise the most traditional form of opposition
when s/he rejects a sexual advance, the courts should be flexible in the
analysis and presume that the employee has successfully spoken out
against an allegedly discriminatory act.
This presumption of speaking out, however, should come at a
cost to the employee. As previously illustrated, the courts have often
been lax when it comes to assessing whether the employee had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer’s act violated Title VII.
The courts have determined through interpreting the opposition clause
that the employee should at least have a reasonable, good-faith belief
that the supervisor violated Title VII for their opposition to be
protected from retaliation. This second requirement serves the purpose
of preventing employees from improperly shielding themselves from
termination by complaining about issues that Title VII does not cover.
Considering the complicated nature of rejection of sexual advances,
the situation is one that demands a harder look at the reasonable, goodfaith belief requirement to protect employers from frivolous opposition
activity. Surprisingly, however, the lower courts that have addressed
facts involving rejection of sexual advances have neglected to apply
the reasonable, good-faith belief requirement in deciding whether the
rejection should be protected.
The discriminatory act arising from a rejection of a sexual
advance will likely be sexual harassment based on a hostile work
environment. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding sexually
hostile work environments is relatively clear, in that the Court requires
that “[f]or sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s]
employment and create an abusive working environment.”96 The
Court has maintained that the work environment must be one that ‘a
reasonable person’ would find hostile, looking at all of the
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circumstances, and that, additionally, the plaintiff must have
subjectively perceived the environment as hostile.97 Factors to assess
within the totality of circumstances include “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether [the conduct] is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance,
and whether [the conduct] unreasonably interferes with [the
complainant’s] work performance.”98
An employee’s claim for retaliation based on the rejection of
sexual advances is linked to an underlying claim of a sexually hostile
work environment. A federal court analyzing such a retaliation claim
must evaluate whether the employee had a reasonable, good-faith
belief that her supervisor has created a hostile work environment that
actually changed the conditions of the employee’s employment. The
fact that a supervisor’s sexual advance was met with an employee’s
rejection is insufficient to establish that the employee’s act is
protected, because there is no inquiry into whether the employee had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that the supervisor created a hostile work
environment. Considering that sexual advances are relatively tame
compared to other scenarios that create a sexually hostile work
environment, showing that the employee had a reasonable, good-faith
belief that such a work environment existed should not be an easy
burden for the employee to bear. The court must be sure that the
advances were made in such a manner and frequency that would
objectively create a hostile work environment and must also confirm
that the employee found the conduct unwelcoming, as opposed to, say,
flattering.
The recommended analysis provides a reasonable compromise
in addressing the rejection of sexual advances. Although the
employee’s rejection is ambiguous in terms of speaking out against
Title VII violations, s/he is presumed to have spoken out considering
the unique nature of such opposition activity. The employer, however,
receives protection from frivolous claims by requiring the employee to
make the difficult showing that s/he had a reasonable, good-faith belief
that her supervisor created a sexually hostile work environment
through his advance.
D.

Policy Considerations

Aside from the legal considerations that justify this comment’s
suggested framework, several policy issues exist that support the
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framework as well. The reality of the workplace is a controlling force
for all employees, and courts should take care to apply the law in a
manner that protects the reasonable party, whether it be the employee
or employer.
1.
Reasons to Presume that an Employee Speaks Out Against a
Title VII Violation in a Rejection of a Sexual Advance Scenario.
If an employee rejects a sexual advance with a simple “No,”
and the courts were to rule that such a rejection is not protected for the
lack of speaking out against a Title VII violation, an untenable
dynamic would result in the workplace. An employee would know
that her rejection is only protected if s/he either engages in traditional
forms of opposition, such as reporting the incident(s) to human
resources or other supervisors, or if s/he specifically references illegal
discrimination in her rejection. Considering that the discriminatory act
the employee will be opposing is a sexually hostile work environment,
the question arises as to when s/he should oppose the conduct in a way
that would be protected. If s/he opposes in a protected manner too
early in a series of advances, s/he runs the risk of being terminated
with no meritorious retaliation claim because s/he likely had no
reasonable, good-faith belief that the supervisor’s behavior was severe
or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. Therefore,
if the employee wants to preserve a potential retaliation claim, the
employee would be encouraged to wait and withstand the abuse of the
sexual advances until it becomes objectively clear that a sexually
hostile work environment has been created. Requiring the plaintiff to
oppose retaliation in a more traditional, specific manner puts her in a
Catch-22, in that s/he risks losing protection under a potential
retaliation claim, or s/he is forced to withstand the abuse of unwanted
sexual advances until s/he can satisfy the requirement that a hostile
work environment was objectively established.
2.
Reasons to Require the Employee to Show That S/he Had a
Reasonable, Good-Faith Belief That a Supervisor Created a Sexually
Hostile Work Environment.
If courts neglect to consider whether an employee had a
reasonable, good-faith belief that a supervisor created a sexually
hostile work environment, then efficiency in the workplace will surely
be affected. First, once management becomes aware that an employee
has rejected the sexual advance of a supervisor, there will be a
presumptive shield around the employee, because the conduct has
already been deemed protected by the law. This can handcuff
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management from applying an adverse employment action against an
employee who may legitimately deserve to be disciplined.
Additionally, from a retaliation claim standpoint, management will
have no incentive to keep supervisors in check once it becomes known
that an employee has rejected a sexual advance. If courts do not
consider an employee’s reasonable, good-faith belief that a sexually,
hostile work environment was created, then there is nothing else in the
retaliation analysis that rewards management for trying to put a stop to
the harassing behavior. If courts would consistently consider the
employee’s reasonable, good-faith belief, then management would
have the incentive to interfere before the employee could objectively
establish the belief that a hostile, work environment has been created.
3.

University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

In June of 2013, the United States Supreme Court determined
the critical issue of causation in the plaintiff’s prima facie case for
retaliation in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v.
Nassar. The case came from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
involved Dr. Nassar, who was a member of the University of Texas
Southwestern Medical Center (“UTSW”) medical faculty.99 Nassar
claimed that UTSW retaliated against him when the medical center
blocked his transfer to an affiliated hospital in response to his
complaint that a supervisor engaged in racial harassment.100 The issue
before the Court was whether the but-for standard, or the mixedmotive standard of causation applies when an employee shows that
his/her protected activity was connected to the employer’s adverse
employment action.101 The Court held that the but-for standard of
causation applies to the plaintiff’s prima facie case in retaliation
claims.102 The Court supported this conclusion through the lack of any
difference between the statutory language in Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provisions and the relevant provisions of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, where in the latter, the Court has previously
determined that the but-for standard of causation applies.103
The Nassar decision further demonstrates that this comment’s
suggested framework would provide a reasonable balance between
employee and employer in rejection of sexual advances scenarios. The
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Court has altered the balance of the plaintiff’s prima facie case by
placing a weight in favor of the employer by establishing a but-for
standard of causation, as opposed to the employee-friendly mixedmotive analysis used in Title VII discrimination claims. In a rejection
of sexual advances scenario, if the courts required employees to
oppose the sexual harassment in a traditional manner beyond the
rejection itself, and further required the employee to show that the
opposition activity was the but-for cause of the adverse employment
action, a fundamental rule of the prima facie case would be lost. It is
well established that the prima facie case, as a whole, is not intended
to be a high hurdle for the plaintiff to clear. Favoring the employer
throughout the plaintiff’s prima facie case is particularly burdensome
considering the fact that the plaintiff must also maintain the burden of
proof throughout the entire McDonnell-Douglas analysis (with the
employer only bearing the burden of production in establishing a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action).
Additionally, more traditional forms of opposition, like complaining to
human resources, is a more revealing process than a mere rejection of
a sexual advance.
Traditional forms of opposition signal to
management that the employee is serious about putting an end to the
harassment, which as a result, could lead management to be more
careful in terminating a “trouble-maker” employee by thoroughly
searching for any performance deficiencies. Considering the but-for
standard of causation the employee bears, it will be much harder for
that employee to meet the standard when the employer is given such a
clear warning signal to cover its bases before a termination. A mere
rejection of a sexual advance will not put such a burden on the
employee when s/he has to prove but for causation, because
management would be unsure of the employee’s degree of resolve to
put an end to the potential harassment.
CONCLUSION
The workplace is a complicated environment, where
professional aspirations will often intersect with personal desires.
When these two interests conflict, particularly in the context of one
party having power over another, adverse consequences like
victimization and decreased efficiency will likely result. Legislators
and the courts do what they can to protect employees in such
situations, but statutory language and judicial frameworks can only
address so many workplace issues. When a unique situation slips
through the cracks, the courts should keep in mind the many
countervailing interests of the workplace in making their
determinations, rather than forcing circles in places that have only
been occupied by squares.
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It has been clear that for an employee to be protected from
retaliation for opposing unlawful acts under Title VII, the employee
must oppose in a way that is statutorily protected. In the factual
scenario involving an employee’s rejection of a supervisor’s sexual
advances, the lower federal courts disagree as to whether such acts are
statutorily protected against retaliation. Some courts subscribe to the
belief that such rejections are not protected against retaliation because
employees have to oppose unlawful acts in a more traditional, explicit
manner to gain statutory protection. Other courts argue that a rejection
alone suffices as a statutorily protected activity, because such
rejections are inherently opposition activity against unlawful acts.
This comment has attempted to demonstrate that the present issue is
too complicated to determine protected activity through an “eyeball
test,” and that the rejection of sexual advances raises a wide range of
considerations and implications that demand a careful analysis. These
considerations and implications reveal that when an employee rejects
her supervisor’s sexual advance(s), s/he should be granted the
presumption that s/he properly “spoke out” against the act. The
presumption, however, should be harnessed by a consistent and
diligent judicial analysis as to whether the employee had a reasonable,
good-faith belief that the supervisor violated Title VII, by referring to
the “severe and pervasive” standard of sexual harassment. This
approach provides a reasonable balance in that it protects the employee
who has rejected sexual advances in the highly political workplace, but
also protects the employer in that the sexual advances need to rise to a
certain level of severity and pervasiveness so that the employee
reasonably believed that she was being subjected to a sexually hostile
work environment.

